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REFLECTIONS OF THE WORLD 
BANK’S REPORT ON THE 
TREATMENT OF THE 
INSOLVENCY OF NATURAL 
PERSONS IN THE NEWEST 
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 
LAWS:  COLOMBIA, ITALY, 
IRELAND 
Jason J. Kilborn* 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In 2011, the World Bank initiated its first-ever examina-
tion of the policies and characteristics of effective insolvency 
systems for individuals (natural persons).  This paper describes 
the two-year process that led to the publication of the World 
Bank’s landmark Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of 
Natural Persons.1  After examining the key content and three 
major themes of the Report, three of the most recent new per-
sonal insolvency regimes are introduced with an eye to identi-
fying the ways in which the themes of the Report are reflected 
in these new laws. The personal insolvency provisions in Co-
                                                            
* John Marshall Law School (Chicago), jkilborn@jmls.edu. Though I 
served as the volunteer chairperson of the committee responsible for drafting 
the World Bank report described here, all comments on the report and its po-
tential interpretation are my own and do not necessarily reflect the position 
of any other member of the drafting committee, the Working Group, the Task 
Force, or the World Bank. I am deeply grateful for the World Bank’s invita-
tion for me to lead this monumental project. All translations of non-English 
materials are mine, and most of the materials cited here for the Colombian 
and Italian developments are unfortunately not available in English. 
1 World Bank, Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Per-
sons (2013) [hereinafter, WB Report].  
1
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lombian law most directly evidence the influence of the World 
Bank project.  Its major themes are reflected distinctly in the 
new laws in Italy and Ireland, as well, though in very different 
ways, lending support to the World Bank’s predictions of con-
vergence but continuing diversity of approach around the world 
in this rapidly developing area of law.  
II. GENESIS, CREATION AND CONTENT OF THE WORLD 
BANK’S REPORT 
In reaction to a financial crisis in emerging markets in 
1997-1998, the World Bank formalized and systematized its 
practice of offering guidance to policymakers in the developing 
world on how to structure effective business bankruptcy and 
restructuring systems.2  While the content and methodology of 
this formal guidance evolved over the first decade of the 21st 
century,3 neither the World Bank nor the International Mone-
tary Fund addressed the parallel challenge of regulating the 
growing problem of personal insolvency and individual over-
indebtedness.4 
When another global financial crisis in 2007-2008 struck 
the household sector head-on and triggered a worldwide reces-
sion, observers inside the Bank recognized that the building 
macro-economic pressure of personal insolvency posed a sys-
temic risk to economic development and international financial 
                                                            
2 WORLD BANK, PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE CREDITOR RIGHTS AND 
INSOLVENCY SYSTEMS, available at http://go.worldbank.org/LYCZB7H890; 
World Bank, Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor 
Rights Systems 2 (2001) available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/ 
default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2009/04/20/000333038_2009 
0420014706/Rendered/PDF/481650WP02001110Box338887B01PUBLIC1.pdf. 
3 World Bank, Principles for Effective Creditor Rights and Insolvency 
Systems, supra note 2 (charting the development of the Principles from 2001 
to their most recent amendment in 2011); see also World Bank, Creditor 
Rights and Insolvency ROSC Assessment Methodology (December 2005 Re-
vised Draft), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GILD/Resources/ 
ROSC_Methodology_ICR_FINAL_(March_09).pdf. 
4 See, e.g., Yan Liu & Christoph B. Rosenberg, International Monetary 
Fund, Dealing with Private Debt Distress in the Wake of the European Fi-
nancial Crisis:  A Review of the Economics and Legal Toolbox, IMF Working 
Paper 13/44 (2013), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1344.pdf 
(noting that, despite an urgent need, “there is no established international 
best practice at all in this area [of household debt restructuring]”). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/6
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stability.5  The World Bank’s Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor 
Regimes Task Force (the “Task Force”) had been instrumental 
in developing strategies for evaluating business insolvency sys-
tems and practices.6  Therefore, the Bank turned to this Task 
Force again at its January 2011 meeting to explore the possibil-
ity of producing guidance for treating the expanding epidemic 
of personal insolvency. 
A. Convening the Committee and Creating the Report  
The Task Force “generally acknowledged the necessity and 
importance for international organizations to develop guidance 
with regard to consumer insolvency law and policy,” as well as 
the “need for the modernization of domestic laws and institu-
tions to enable jurisdictions to deal effectively and efficiently 
with the risks of individual over indebtedness.”7 Consequently, 
the World Bank and the Task Force created a special Working 
Group on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons 
(the “Working Group”) to examine the most salient issues, poli-
cies, and practices implicated distinctly in the context of per-
sonal insolvency, as opposed to the liquidation or restructuring 
of business entities.8  The Working Group’s specific assignment 
was “to study the issue of natural person insolvency and pro-
duce a reflective document on this matter, suggesting guidance 
for the treatment of the different issues involved, and taking 
into account different policy options and the diverse sensitivi-
ties around the world.”9 
For the hands-on task of drafting this reflective document, 
the Working Group reached out to several academics who had 
concentrated for years on a comparative analysis of the policies 
and developing practices of treating personal insolvency.10 
                                                            
5 Susan Block-Lieb, The World Bank, Best Practices in the Insolvency of 
Natural Persons:  Rapporteur’s Synopsis ¶¶ 1, 17 (2011), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGILD/Resources/ 
WB_TF_2011_Consumer_Insolvency.pdf; WB Report, supra note 1, ¶ 3. 
6 For a description of this Task Force, see WB Report, supra note 1, ¶ 2 
(describing the Task Force as “[b]ringing together experienced judges, expert 
practitioners, academics and policymakers from around the world”). 
7 Block-Lieb, supra note 5, ¶¶ 14, 17. 
8 Id. ¶ 17; WB Report, supra note 1, ¶¶ 5-7. 
9 WB Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7. 
10 José Garrido, Senior Counsel in the World Bank’s Legal Vice Presiden-
3
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Their collective knowledge and perspectives would provide the 
baseline for drafting a report to be discussed, debated, and 
adopted over the next two years by the Working Group and the 
larger Task Force.  The drafting committee produced a first 
draft for discussion at the Working Group’s first meeting at the 
World Bank in Washington, D.C., in November 2011.11 In re-
sponse to numerous comments and questions, the committee 
revised the report over the course of the following year and 
presented a second draft at the Working Group’s second and fi-
nal meeting in December 2012.12 Both the Working Group and 
the Task Force approved the final Report on the Treatment of 
the Insolvency of Natural Persons, which was subsequently 
published on the World Bank’s website, within the Global In-
solvency Law Database.13
  
B. Overview of the Report and Its Three Main Themes  
As the Working Group’s assignment14 and the name of the 
document reflect, the Report is a “reflective document”; that is, 
it does not offer prescriptions or even recommendations.15 Its 
purpose is to inform policymakers, first as to the need for and 
many advantages offered by a system for treating personal in-
solvency;16 and second as to the characteristics of existing sys-
                                                                                                                                     
cy, recruited and actively participated in the drafting committee, providing 
both vital coordination and extremely insightful comments on the report 
throughout the drafting process.  The drafting committee was chaired by Ja-
son Kilborn, of John Marshall Law School (Chicago, USA), joined by Charlie 
Booth, of the University of Hawai’i School of Law (USA), Johanna Niemi, of 
the University of Helsinki Faculty of Law (Finland), and Iain Ramsay, of 
Kent Law School at the University of Kent (England). 
11 WB REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 8; see also Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor 
Regimes Task Force Meeting (2011), available at http://go.worldbank.org/ 
X9MIOVN9Y0. 
12 WB REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 8; see also Working Group for the Treat-
ment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons, WORLD BANK INSOLVENCY LAW 
DATABASE, (Last updated June 5, 2013), available at http://go.worldbank.org/ 
6NEL6E0A10. 
13 See Statement on the Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Nat-
ural Persons (Dec. 14, 2012), http://go.worldbank.org/F28SN44XE0. 
14 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
15 WB REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 55. 
16 I will use the terms “insolvency” and “over indebtedness” interchange-
ably, and I will refer to “personal,” “individual,” and perhaps “consumer” as 
interchangeable adjectives to describe the subject of the problem to be treat-
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/6
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tems that have proven most effective and most problematic.17  
An extended introductory section lays an important foundation 
in winning hearts and minds, implicitly but unmistakably sug-
gesting that more countries should give serious consideration 
to adopting a system for treating personal over indebtedness.18  
After cataloguing the proper orientation of a personal insolven-
cy system within the context of similar legal structures for 
combatting, for example, poverty and business insolvency,19 the 
Report lays out a wide variety of advantages—for creditors, 
debtors, and society—identified by lawmakers as the reasons 
for their having adopted personal insolvency regimes.20  The in-
troductory section concludes with a discussion of several factors 
that have hindered the adoption or implementation of effective 
means for addressing personal insolvency.  It suggests that 
fears of moral hazard and fraud by debtors have scant empiri-
cal foundation and can be overcome with proper administrative 
procedures, while struggling with social stigma and reluctance 
by debtors to seek relief remains the more significant chal-
lenge.21 
As to the optimal way to structure a legal system for treat-
ing personal insolvency, the Working Group concluded that no 
one set of approaches could be identified as the “best” practices 
in this area, and attempting to impose one standard on widely 
varying cultures and socio-economic contexts would be uncon-
structive.22 Nonetheless, the language of the Report clearly in-
dicates that some approaches are preferable to others that have 
caused substantial problems and rendered existing systems 
less efficient and less effective.23  
Indeed, the Report references several “precedents” that 
                                                                                                                                     
ed.  As to the complications with language, especially the key question of how 
to refer to the people being treated, the condition being treated, and the sys-
tem for treating it, see WB Report, supra note 1, ¶¶ 17-18. 
17 WB REPORT, supra note 1, ¶¶ 10, 55, 391-92. 
18 A preliminary World Bank survey had revealed that “in more than half 
of the middle and low income countries surveyed there is no system [address-
ing consumer insolvency] at all.”  BLOCK-LIEB, supra note 5,¶1. 
19 WB REPORT, supra note 1, ¶¶ 17-18, 25-52. 
20 Id. ¶¶ 56-111. 
21 Id. ¶¶ 112-25. 
22 Id. ¶¶ 12, 53-55. 
23 WB REPORT, supra note 1, ¶¶ 131-34, 266-67, 277, 279, 285-89, 311-13. 
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served as source material for its preparation,24 some of which 
make explicit recommendations as to at least better, if not best, 
practices. For example, both the first and second edition of 
INSOL International’s Consumer Debt Report25 contain numer-
ous, specific recommendations.  Also, the Council of Europe’s 
Report on Legal Solutions to Debt Problems In Credit Societies26 
makes several broad but clear recommendations, which were 
ultimately adopted formally as human rights norms by the 
Council of Europe.27  These and other recommendations from 
international organizations are reflected in the World Bank’s 
Report, and they all form a consistent baseline of at least min-
imal best practice in personal insolvency treatment.28 
 Although the Report eschews recommendations as to op-
timal detail,29 three major themes stand out from both the Re-
port and the recommendations from international organiza-
tions that preceded it. These three themes are useful, high-
level guidelines by which to evaluate existing and new personal 
                                                            
24 Id. ¶¶ 19-21. 
25 INSOL INTERNATIONAL, CONSUMER DEBT REPORT:  REPORT OF FINDINGS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11-31 (2001), http://www.insol.org/pdf/consdebt.pdf; 
INSOL INTERNATIONAL, CONSUMER DEBT REPORT II: REPORT OF 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13-24 (2011). 
26 Johanna Niemi-Kiesiläinen & Ann-Sofie Henrikson, Bureau of the Eu-
ropean Committee on Legal Co-Operation Report on Legal Solutions to Debt 
Problems In Credit Societies (2005). 
27 A working group formulated a series of final recommendations and an 
explanatory memorandum in February 2007.  Final Activity Report of the 
Group of Specialist for Legal Solutions to Debt Problems (CJ-S-DEBT) (2007). 
These recommendations were adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe in June 2007. Legal solutions to debt problems: Recommen-
dation Rec(2007)8 and explanatory memorandum, available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1155927&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=9
999CC&BackColorIntranet=FFBB5 5&BackColorLogged=FFAC75#. 
28 For a survey and analysis of several prominent recommendations from 
international organizations, see JASON J. KILBORN, EXPERT RECOMMENDATIONS 
AND THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN BEST PRACTICES FOR THE TREATMENT OF 
OVERINDEBTEDNESS, 1984-2010 (2011).   
29 The Report discusses several topics under the heading “Core Legal At-
tributes of an Insolvency Regime for Natural Persons,” including, in addition 
to the major themes discussed below, (i) institutional framework (placement 
within the corpus of the law, the roles of advisers, counselors, and courts ver-
sus administrative agencies, financing issues), (ii) access and restrictions on 
access, (iii) limited creditor participation, (iv) liquidation of estate property 
and exemptions from liquidation, (v) plan supervision and modification, and 
(vi) special consideration of the payment of mortgages and other secured 
loans.  WB Report, supra note 1, ¶¶ 139-261, 302-09, 319-53. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/6
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insolvency systems, as this paper will do in the following Part.  
First, as mentioned above,30 the most powerful overarching 
theme of the Report is that countries who have not already 
done so should implement a formal legal mechanism by which 
over indebted persons can seek relief in the form of a forced 
discharge of some or all31 of their debts.32  This has been a uni-
fying and consistent theme of previous recommendations from 
international organizations spanning the past twenty years.33  
The Task Force’s public statement announcing the completion 
of this project stresses that “[a]n effective regime for the insol-
vency of natural persons is of crucial importance for economic 
development and financial inclusion.”34As the World Bank’s 
preliminary survey reveals, however, many high-, middle-, and 
low-income countries continue to resist the notion of freeing in-
dividuals from their legitimate contractual and delictual obli-
gations.35  Perhaps this will begin to change as the World Bank 
adds its voice and gravitas to the chorus of those calling for 
personal insolvency relief.  
 Second, the Report echoes another earlier theme relating 
to negotiated workouts, though in decidedly less sanguine 
terms.  For a variety of reasons, most importantly avoiding the 
costs and other burdens of formal intervention, the Report 
notes a widespread policy preference for debtors not to use the 
formal relief system.36  Instead, debtors are encouraged to seek 
informal— or at least out-of-court—negotiated solutions to 
their financial distress.  This was another prominent theme of 
earlier international recommendations, almost as unifying as 
                                                            
30 See WB REPORT, supra notes 1¶¶ 17-18, 25-52, 56-111; BLOCK-LIEB, 
supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
31 The Report is more explicit in its preference for a broad discharge, not 
riddled with exceptions and exclusions. WB REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 367 (“[I]t 
is important that as many of the debtor’s debts as possible be included in the 
scope of the discharge.”). 
32 Id. ¶¶ 354, 444 (observing that an essential element of economic reha-
bilitation, and a precondition for the many benefits outlined in the introduc-
tory section, is that “the debtor has to be freed from excessive debt”). 
33 See KILBORN, supra note 28, at 18. 
34 Statement on the Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural 
Persons, THE WORLD BANK, INSOLVENCY LAW DATABASE, (Dec. 14, 2012), 
available at http://go.worldbank.org/F28SN44XE0. 
35 See BLOCK-LIEB, supra note 18. 
36 WB REPORT, supra note 1, ¶¶ 128-30. 
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the desire for a compulsory discharge.37 
 The World Bank’s Report distinguishes itself from earlier 
commentary on the preference for voluntary solutions, howev-
er, by emphasizing the practical challenges to achieving this 
theoretically attractive goal.  Noting that “the merits of volun-
tary settlements are often illusory,” the Report cites the dan-
gers of long delays and debtors being pressured to agree to “on-
erous payment plans that are not viable” and reveals that, for a 
variety of powerful reasons, only a small portion of cases have 
concluded with voluntary settlements even where institutional 
support for such negotiations was present.38 In fact, the Report 
notes one country’s abandonment of an earlier requirement 
that debtors seek voluntary workouts as a prerequisite to entry 
into the formal relief system due to the inevitable failure of 
such negotiations.    
If out-of-court, negotiated settlements are to have any 
chance of success, the Report points out that, “some institu-
tional support and incentives are needed,” including free or 
low-cost assistance from professional advisors with experience 
negotiating with creditors.39  The most substantial successes 
have emerged when a government regulator has played a more 
direct guiding role, such as by adopting codes of conduct for 
creditor behavior in such negotiations.40 
The third and final most salient theme relates to the condi-
tions for relief, the quid pro quo to be expected of debtors in ex-
change for the extraordinary relief of discharge of legitimate 
debt.  A general desire for a careful balance between debtor and 
creditor interests came through powerfully in the Working 
Group’s discussions and is reflected in the Report.41 A crucial 
aspect of that balance is an almost universal demand in exist-
ing systems that debtors earn their fresh start by subjecting 
themselves to a rehabilitation plan and endeavoring to make 
some level of installment payments to creditors.42
 
The core of 
this third theme is that these rehabilitation plans should be 
                                                            
37 See KILBORN, supra note 28, at 23-24. 
38 WB REPORT, supra note 1, ¶¶ 131, 133-34, 404. 
39 Id. ¶¶ 135, 137. 
40 Id. ¶ 136. 
41 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 57, 115, 270, 283. 
42 Id. ¶¶ 262, 356. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/6
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formulated with care, sensitive to the capacity of debtors to 
bear whatever burdens are imposed on them.43 This key aspect 
of insolvency administration has been the focus of other inter-
national recommendations, as well, with a consistent emphasis 
on moderating burdens and respecting debtors’ human digni-
ty.44  Expectations that these payment plans will produce sub-
stantial returns for creditors are destined for disappointment.45 
 The Report catalogues potential challenges in terms of 
both plan duration and the amount of payment debtors are 
called on to make to creditors over the life of the plan.46 It cau-
tions that there seems to be an “inverse relationship between 
plan length and plan success”;47 that is, longer plans fail, and 
the goals of an insolvency treatment system will be under-
mined if fewer debtors enter or are successful due to extended 
payment plans.48  Likewise with respect to payment expecta-
tions, the Report is critical of any requirement of a minimum 
required payment or percentage dividend to creditors, which 
“invariably produces undesirable results,” depriving 
“[s]ignificant numbers of ‘honest but unfortunate’ debtors” of 
needed relief.49  The most effective approach to determining 
payment demands “is less a matter of defining a predetermined 
benefit for creditors than of defining a predetermined level of 
sacrifice for debtors.”50  This sacrifice is most effectively based 
on a legislative determination of reasonable subsistence budg-
ets sufficient to sustain a modest but dignified lifestyle for var-
ious types of debtors and families, with “surplus” income dedi-
cated to creditors.51 
 The Report is roundly critical of relying on judicial or ad-
ministrative discretion in determining either the length or the 
payment demands of such rehabilitation plans.52 “The appro-
                                                            
43 Id. ¶ 358 (“A realistic view of debtors’ situations, however, often leads 
to prioritizing more lenient and shorter payment plans …”). 
44 See KILBORN, supra note 28, at 53. 
45 WB REPORT, supra note 1, ¶¶ 264-65, 298-300, 312. 
46 Id. ¶¶ 262-301. 
47 Id. ¶ 270. 
48 Id. ¶ 265. 
49 Id. ¶ 357. 
50 Id. ¶ 274. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. ¶¶ 267, 285-89. 
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priate measure of sacrifice to be demanded of debtors in ex-
change for whatever relief an insolvency system offers is a cru-
cial and inherently political decision,” the Report asserts, con-
cluding that “[s]uch a central issue of public policy is likely 
better made by a legislature or other representative entity, ra-
ther than by the administrators of the insolvency system.”53 
III. REFLECTIONS IN THE NEWEST PERSONAL INSOLVENCY 
LAWS:  COLOMBIA, ITALY, IRELAND 
The Report is based on observations of developments in 
systems in place before 2012.  It was drafted in the hope that it 
might provide some useful guidance to policymakers in the pro-
cess of developing new laws for treating personal over indebt-
edness.54 This Part looks at three of the newest personal insol-
vency regimes to identify the degree to which the main themes 
of the Report are reflected in the general approaches and spe-
cific provisions of these new laws.  
To the extent that the record reflects this, it also searches 
for evidence that the Report had any direct impact on policy-
makers’ decision-making processes.  Examination of the legis-
lative process in Colombia, Italy, and Ireland reveals that the 
World Bank project had a direct impact in at least one of these 
countries, and the results in all three nations reflect—to vary-
ing degrees and in quite different ways—a desire to conform to 
the Report’s three main themes.  
A. Colombia  
The most powerful example of the influence of the Report 
is presented in the case of Colombia.  Not only are the themes 
of the Report reflected in Colombia’s new personal insolvency 
law, but the content of that law changed dramatically as a di-
rect result of the World Bank project.  
Colombian policymakers had for some time been concerned 
about protecting over indebted individuals, especially those not 
engaged in commercial activity.  A formal bankruptcy system 
for businesses and individual merchants had been in place in 
                                                            
53 Id. ¶ 290. 
54 Id. ¶¶ 7, 10, 22, 55. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/6
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one form or another in Columbia for over a century.55  But nev-
er had the law addressed the specific concerns of over indebted 
individuals not engaged in commerce.56 
The lack of attention to consumer debtors became the sub-
ject of serious concern in 2007 when the Constitutional Court 
was reviewing the latest in a series of insolvency laws, which 
explicitly excluded individual debtors not engaged in com-
merce.57 In its order, the Court exhorted the Colombian Con-
gress to implement a regime specifically aimed at addressing 
the insolvency of non-merchant individuals.58  On 31 July 2008, 
several members of the House of Representatives (Cámara de 
Representantes) introduced a bill to respond to the Constitu-
tional Court’s call to action.59  The motivation behind the law 
was expressed not in humanitarian terms, but in a desire to 
enhance productivity and protect the availability of consumer 
credit by allowing over indebted, non-merchant individuals to 
rehabilitate their finances and “be reintegrated rapidly into the 
financial system.”60 
The 2008 bill did not, however, propose an insolvency re-
gime along the lines ultimately envisioned in the World Bank 
Report. It did not provide for a mandatory discharge of debts 
that the consumer debtor was unable to pay.  Instead, this new 
system was introduced and structured simply as “a procedure 
for negotiation of debts.”61  Though novel in its focus, this legis-
lative initiative did little more than provide a brief stay of debt 
enforcement procedures and explicitly assign the task of debt 
settlement negotiation to the existing network of Conciliation 
                                                            
55 Ponencia para Primer Debate al Proyecto de Ley Numero 346 de 2009 
Senado, 055 de 2008 Camara, Gaceta del Congreso 912/2009 (17 Sept.) at 1-2 
(describing the history of Colombian bankruptcy law). 
56 Proyecto de Ley Numero 055 de 2008 Camara, Gaceta del Congreso 
494/2008 (1 Aug.) at 8. 
57 Id. (citing article 3, point 8, of Law 1116 of 2006, excluding from the 
insolvency regime “natural persons who are not merchants”). 
58 Id. (citing Constitutional Court Judgment C-699 of 2007); see also Po-
nencia, supra note 55, at 2-4 (quoting the Constitutional Court decision ex-
tensively). 
59 Proyecto, supra note 56, at 4, 9 (noting the date of introduction of 
House Bill 055 of 2008, “whereby a regime of insolvency for non-merchant 
natural persons is established”). 
60 Id. at 7-9. 
61 Id. at 8. 
11
6. PROFESSOR JASON KILBORN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/15  5:26 PM 
2015]      REFLECTIONS OF THE WORLD BANK’S REPORT  317 
Centers,62
 
which had been created as part of a National Concil-
iation Program in 1991.63  This limited “debt conciliation” ap-
proach passed through both houses of Congress and in January 
2010 became the first legal regime in South America specifical-
ly designed to address the insolvency of non-merchant individ-
uals.64 
The new law was short-lived.  The Constitutional Court 
declared it void on technical procedural grounds, as the final 
vote adopting the reconciled bill was held in an extraordinary 
session of Congress, which had not been properly announced by 
a timely published decree.65
 
Luckily for Colombian consumers, 
their legislators continued to pursue the goal of implementing 
the first South American personal insolvency regime.  A much 
larger project to reenact the Code of Civil Procedure was pro-
ceeding through Congress, so within weeks of the Constitution-
al Court’s judgment, lawmakers in the House of Representa-
tives attached the personal insolvency provisions to the bill for 
the new Code of Civil Procedure, adding a new Title on the in-
solvency regime for non-merchant natural persons.66  These 
provisions remained, however, “in essence eminently concilia-
tory,” still not providing for any compulsory discharge of debt.67
 
 
Meanwhile, the Justice Ministry appointed several experts 
to reexamine the personal insolvency provisions incorporated 
                                                            
62 Id. at 4-7 (providing in articles 4-18 for a negotiation procedure with a 
stay of ongoing execution proceedings, but otherwise not constraining credi-
tors’ right to reject workout agreements and recommence execution).    
63 See MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR Y DE JUSTICIA, CONCILIACION Y ARBITRAJE: 
NORMATIVIDAD, JURISPRUDENCIA Y CONCEPTOS [MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND 
JUSTICE, CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION: REGULATION, JURISPRUDENCE AND 
CONCEPTS]145-46, 175,  (2d ed. 2007), available at  
http://www.conciliacion.gov.co/archivos/documentos/Publicaciones/Libro%20co
nciliacion%20y%20arbitraje%202007.pdf. 
64 Law 1380 of 2010, Diario Oficial 47603 (25 Jan. 2010). 
65 Constitutional Court Communication no. 38, Judgment C-685 (19 Sept. 
2011),  
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/comunicados/No.%2038%20comuni
cado%2019%20y%2021%20de%20septi embre%20de%202011.php; Corte 
tumbó Ley de Insolvencia Económica para personas naturales [Court 
overturns Law on Economic Insolvency for natural persons], Elpaís.com.co 
(20 Sept. 2011), http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/economia/corte-tumbo-ley-
insolvencia-economica-para-personas-naturales.  
66 Informe de Ponencia para Segundo Debate al Proyecto de Ley Número 
196 de 2011 Cámara, Gaceta del Congreso 745/2011 (4 Oct.) at 29-30, 211-23. 
67 Id. at 30. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/6
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into the new Code of Civil Procedure.68  Among the individuals 
appointed to this group was the main insolvency law expert-
advisor to the Superintendent of Companies,69 the Colombian 
agency in charge of business bankruptcy and restructuring 
proceedings.70  Coincidentally, this expert is also a member of 
the World Bank’s Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes 
Task Force and its Working Group on the Treatment of the In-
solvency of Natural Persons.71  Consequently, the Superinten-
dent of Companies had access to the first draft of the World 
Bank Report, presented to the Working Group in November 
2011.72 
The Superintendent of Companies’ insolvency expert com-
mended the approach of the World Bank Report to the other 
experts appointed by the Ministry of Justice, in particular “the 
need to include the ‘discharge’ as part of the new policy.”73 The 
Ministry of Justice’s expert group reformulated the personal 
insolvency provisions, most notably to include a compelled dis-
charge of debt after distribution of the value of the debtor’s 
non-exempt assets—the most essential theme of the World 
Bank Report.74  After the revised articles on debt negotiation 
and discharge were approved by the Ministry of Justice, the 
Government proposed that these provisions be included in the 
                                                            
68 Email from Diana Lucia Talero Castro, Superintendency of Compa-
nies, to author (July 26, 2013)(on file with author). 
69 Id. 
70 Superintendencia de sociedades, Objetivo Misional, 
http://www.supersociedades.gov.co/delegatura-para-procesosde-
insolvencia/objetivo-misional/Paginas/default.aspx. 
71 The expert’s name appears on the member list of the Working Group, 
which is not a public document but is on file with author.  For the back-
ground of these two groups, see supra notes 6 and 8 and accompanying text. 
72 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. WB REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 
8; see also Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes Task Force Meeting 
(2011), available at http://go.worldbank.org/X9MIOVN9Y0. 
73 Email from Diana Lucia Talero Castro, supra note 68; see also Diana 
Lucia Talero Castro, Insolvency of Natural Persons in Colombia slide 3, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGILD/Resources/5807554-
1357753286498/Colombia_Talero.pdf (PowerPoint presentation at World 
Bank, 13 Dececember 2012, noting the new Colombian law is “[b]ased on the 
World Bank’s report on the treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons”). 
74 See WB REPORT, supra notes 1¶¶ 17-18, 25-52, 56-111, 367, 354, 444; 
BLOCK-LIEB, supra note 5; KILBORN, supra note 28 at 18 and accompanying 
text. 
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final bill on the Code of Civil Procedure.75 Supportive Senators 
agreed to do so in March 2012, immediately preceding the first 
debate on the bill in the Senate (Senado).76 
Now Title IV of Section Three of Book Three of the Code of 
Civil Procedure,77 the debt negotiation and discharge provi-
sions passed through the legislative reconciliation process78 
and emerged as part of Law 1564 of 12 July 2012.79 The provi-
sions enacting the new personal insolvency regime became ef-
fective on 1 October 2012,80 though it took a few more months 
for the necessary regulatory framework to be put in place by 
the Ministry of Justice on 21 December 2012.81 
Thanks to the efforts of the Ministry of Justice and the Su-
perintendent of Companies, the new Colombian personal insol-
vency rules clearly reflect the first major theme of the World 
Bank Report: After the distribution among creditors of whatev-
er non-exempt assets the debtor possesses, any debts remain-
ing unpaid “mutate into natural obligations”;82 that is, they are 
legally discharged, becoming morally but not legally enforcea-
ble, as “[u]nsatisfied creditors of the debtor cannot pursue as-
sets that the debtor acquires after the initiation of the liquida-
tion procedure.”83  This is just the sort of relief envisioned and 
encouraged in the World Bank Report,84 and the new Colombi-
an law implements it in a particularly effective and efficient 
                                                            
75 Email from Diana Lucia Talero Castro, supra note 68. 
76 Informe de Ponencia para Primer Debate Proyecto de Ley Número 159 
de 2011 Senado, 196 de 2011 Cámara, Gaceta del Congreso 114/2012 (28 
Mar.) at 49-114. 
77 Articles 531 to 576. 
78 Informe de Conciliación al Proyecto de Ley Número 159 de 2011 
Senado, 196 de 2011 Cámara, Gaceta del Congreso 316/2012 (6 June) 
(adopting the bill as passed in the second debate in the Senate). 
79 L. 15/109, julio 12, 2012, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.). 
80 Ley 1564 de 2012 art. 627(4). 
81 Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho, Decreto Número 2677 de 21 dic. 
2012. 
82 CÓDIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO CIVIL [C.P.C.] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] 
art. 571(1) [hereinafter “CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE“]. 
83 Id.; see also CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 82, art. 565(2) 
(“[A]ssets that the debtor acquires after [the opening of insolvency proceed-
ings] may only be pursued by creditors of obligations contracted after this 
date.”). 
84 See W.B. REPORT supra note 1, ¶¶  367, 354, 444  31-32 and accompa-
nying text. 
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way.  This is a rare case of two ongoing projects overlapping 
quite by coincidence, such that one had a direct and salutary 
impact on the other.  
The Colombian law powerfully reflects the second of the 
World Bank Report’s three themes, as well, with its emphasis 
on and institutional support for voluntary negotiation with 
creditors. As with many other national laws, the Colombian 
law is structured around a distinct preference for voluntary, 
private or semi-private negotiation, without formal interven-
tion.  The law was originally conceived to be only this, a plat-
form for facilitating private workouts of excessive personal 
debt.85  Until the serendipitous convergence between the pro-
gressing Colombian bill and the World Bank project via the du-
al participation of the Superintendent of Companies, the Co-
lombian law contained little more than a hint of interference 
with private ordering and negotiation.86  Even in its final form, 
though, the Colombian personal insolvency law still distinctly 
favors voluntary conciliation between overburdened debtors 
and their creditors. Debt negotiation is still listed as the first 
objective of the law,87 the provisions on debt negotiation pro-
ceedings are listed first,88 and the only avenue for seeking relief 
via a liquidation and discharge is through an attempted but 
unsuccessful debt negotiation proceeding.89 
Most important, and also reflecting the World Bank Re-
port’s observations on the challenges of out-of-court workouts, 
the Colombian regime supports the desired informal solutions 
in two particularly impressive ways.  First, private debt nego-
tiation fits quite comfortably within a well-established national 
program of conciliation of private disputes.90 A network of con-
ciliation centers spans the country, providing a ready support 
                                                            
85 See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. 
86 See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. 
87 CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 82, art. 531 (listing the law’s 
three objectives, two of which involve debt negotiation). 
88 Id. arts. 538-62. 
89 Id. art. 563 (providing for the opening of a liquidation-and-discharge 
proceeding only upon the failure of an attempted debt negotiation under the 
preceding provisions, a declaration of nullity of a previously negotiated 
workout agreement, or the debtor’s failure to fulfill a previously negotiated 
workout agreement). 
90 On the national conciliation program, spearheaded by the Ministry of 
Justice and Law, see http://www.conciliacion.gov.co/. 
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mechanism for non-merchant individuals who otherwise would 
be unlikely to have the knowledge and skill to represent them-
selves effectively in debt negotiations with creditors.91 This is 
precisely the kind of support network that the World Bank Re-
port envisions in its comments on overcoming the numerous 
barriers to effective privately negotiated solutions.92
  
Second, another key provision entered the law at the same 
time as the discharge provision, a new way of regulating when 
a “voluntary” workout plan has been accepted and is effective. 
Without formal intervention, the simple rule of contract law 
would be that a plan that binds any creditor would have to be 
accepted by each creditor, since no one creditor’s contractual 
rights can be altered unilaterally by the debtor, without that 
creditor’s consent.93 The Colombian law ensures that an ac-
ceptable workout agreement cannot be undermined by a dis-
senting minority of holdout creditors, however, in its unique 
provision on the validity of negotiated plans. For a debt negoti-
ation agreement (called in the law a “payment agreement”94) to 
be valid and effective, it must encompass all of the debtor’s 
creditors,95 but it need not be approved by all creditors; rather, 
at least two creditors holding claims exceeding 50% of the debt-
or’s total principal debt load must approve the agreement.96  
That is, even if creditors holding 49% of the value of all claims 
against the debtor reject a proposed payment plan, the plan is 
                                                            
91 See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text; see also CODE OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, supra note 82, art. 533 (assigning responsibility for debt negotia-
tion proceedings first to the existing conciliation centers “expressly author-
ized by the Ministry of Justice and Law to facilitate [advance] this type of 
proceedings, via conciliators registered in their lists” as well as to notary of-
fices, who also have registered conciliators with the proper training required 
by regulation); Ministry of Justice and Law, Decree no. 2677 of 21 December 
2012, art. 13-15 (requiring specialized training for personal debt conciliators); 
Ministry of Justice and Law, Resolution no. 21 of 15 June 2013 (outlining the 
minimum content of training programs for conciliators).  Both of these regu-
lations are available, in Spanish only, online at 
http://www.conciliacion.gov.co/paginas_detalle.aspx?idp=173. 
92 See W.B. REPORT supra note 1, ¶135, 137.  
93 See, e.g., W.B. REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 134 (noting that “one of several 
creditors may make settlement impossible through a veto”). 
94 CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 82, art. 553 (“Acuerdo de pago”). 
95 Id. art. 553(3). 
96 Id. art. 553(2) (excluding claims for interest, fines, and penalties, legal 
or contractual, from the total debt load). 
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nonetheless imposed on these dissenters if creditors holding a 
majority of the value of claims approves the plan.  If this plan 
is successfully completed by the debtor,97 all of the claims en-
compassed within the plan are considered fully satisfied, and 
no further enforcement may be pursued on those claims 
against the debtor, co-debtors, or guarantors.98 
Finally, the Colombian law takes a rare approach in reject-
ing the third theme of a required payment plan as part of the 
“earned start” discharge process.  The alternative to a negotiat-
ed payment plan is a distribution to creditors of the debtor’s 
available assets, followed by an immediate and unconditional 
discharge—without any provision for payments from the debt-
ors’ future income.99  Perhaps this is part of a larger strategy 
that dovetails with the law’s emphasis on voluntary concilia-
tion.  As noted above,100 the Colombian regime requires debtors 
to seek assistance from conciliation centers (or other sources) 
for negotiating settlement arrangements with creditors before 
seeking coercive relief in the form of a discharge.101 But the law 
indirectly pressures creditors to accept whatever payment the 
debtor reasonably has to offer from his or her future income, 
since if creditors reject that, they are likely to receive little or 
nothing of value from the debtor’s meagre present assets.  Most 
personal insolvency cases around the world reveal little or no 
value in the debtor’s present assets.102 By refusing to allow 
creditors to access debtors’ future income in the liquidation-
and-discharge process, the Colombian law may have struck on 
an ingenious strategy for leveraging greater voluntary payment 
agreements in the first stage of insolvency proceedings.  
                                                            
97 The expected duration of such plans is five years, though longer terms 
are allowed with the assent of 60% of creditors or for claims with an original 
maturity period exceeding five years.  Id. art. 553(10). 
98 Id. art. 558. 
99 Id. arts. 563-71. 
100 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
101 The Colombian regime thus joins that in “many countries” with a two-
stage procedure of required negotiation followed by formal, compelled insol-
vency relief.  See W.B. REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 129. 
102 See id. ¶ 221 (noting that “the overwhelming majority of debtors in 
every existing system … have proven to have few if any assets of any value 
that are available for liquidation and distribution to creditors”). 
17
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B. Italy  
Italy took an almost identical path to its first personal in-
solvency regime as did Colombia.  The final result, however, 
was markedly different.  Just as Colombia did, Italy started 
down this path hesitantly, adopting a law in January 2012103 
that simply provided a statutory framework for negotiated debt 
settlements.104  Indeed, such settlements were binding only on 
creditors who agreed, requiring full (though slightly deferred) 
payment to dissenting creditors.105
 
Moreover, debtors could 
propose such settlements to their creditors only with the in-
termediation of so-called Crisis Composition Bodies (Organis-
mo di composizione della crisi), a new institution whose mem-
bers would be drawn from business mediation bodies and 
professional associations of lawyers, notaries, and account-
ants.106 The fledgling negotiation procedure was all but doomed 
to failure, and in the first eight months of its effectiveness, only 
two cases were filed, one each in Rome and Florence.107  
 
The Government had anticipated this problem.  It had at-
tempted twice in the first months of 2012 to propose more ef-
fective relief in the form of a non-negotiated discharge, but its 
                                                            
103 Law of 27 January 2012, no. 3 (G.U. no. 24, 30 Jan. 2012 ), Dis-
posizioni in materia di usura e di estorsione, nonché di composizione delle 
crisi da sovraindebitamento [Regulation on usury and extortion, as well as on 
settlement of overindebtedness crises] [hereinafter Law 3/2012]. 
104 Study on Means to Protect Consumers in Financial Difficulty: Personal 
Bankruptcy, datio in solutum of Mortgages, and Restrictions on Debt Collec-
tion Abusive Practices, London Economics 64 (Contract No 
MARKT/2011/023/B2/ST/FC 2012), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-
retail/docs/fsug/papers/debt_solutions_report_en.pdf. 
105 Id.; see also Giorgio Cherubini, New Italian law for over-indebtedness, 
EUROFENIX (Winter 2012/13) at 36, online at www.insol-
europe.org/download/file_/8408. 
106 Cherubini, supra note 105 , at,37 n. 4. 
107 Decreto di Legge 18 ottobre 2012, n. 3533 (It.). no. 3533, Conversione 
in legge del decreto-legge 18 ottobre 2012, n. 179, recante ulteriori misure ur-
genti per la crescita del Paese (19 Oct. 2012) [Draft Law no. 3533, Conversion 
into law of decree-law 18 October 2012, n. 179, concerning further urgent 
measures for the country's growth], Relazione [Introductory Report of the 
Government] at 39, online at 
http://www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/16/DDLPRES/681211/index.html; 
http://www.legautonomie.it/content/download/8831/46405/file/S.3533.pdf 
[hereinafter Relazione 179/2012]. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/6
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efforts had been rebuffed by the legislature.108 While the record 
contains no indication that the Government’s reform efforts 
were influenced by the World Bank Report, the first draft of 
which had just been released a few months earlier at the end of 
2011, the timing is remarkable.109 
Finally in the fall of 2012, the Government tied its desired 
insolvency reforms to a much larger bill aimed at spurring eco-
nomic growth.110 Introducing the new personal insolvency pro-
visions, the Government attributed the “structural failure” of 
the January 2012 debt settlement law to Italy’s failure to con-
form its laws to comparative analysis:  “all countries in which a 
regulation is provided for the resolution of economic crises like 
the one with which we are dealing, have opted for a bankruptcy 
instrument with a discharge, and not negotiated [solutions] of a 
transitory nature.”111  Further shaming legislators with this 
comparative point, the Government observed that even neigh-
boring Greece had adopted a personal discharge law in 2010, 
leaving Italy in the company of countries such as China, Vi-
etnam, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Hungary without an effective 
discharge law.112 The legislature reacted swiftly, passing the 
proposed reforms of Law No. 3 of January 2012 into law on 17 
December 2012.113 
Reflecting the World Bank Report’s first theme, the reform 
law modifies the earlier Law no. 3 of 2012 to include an express 
provision for a non-negotiated discharge of unsatisfied debts 
following official liquidation of the debtor’s non-exempt proper-
                                                            
108 Id. 
109 Moreover, the Working Group and the Task Force included several 
Italian members, one of whom later wrote of Decree-Law 179/2012 that it 
represented Italy’s coming into line with other Western systems “in conformi-
ty with the recommendations of the World Bank.”  Luciano Panzani, La 
Composizione della Crisi da Sovraindebitamento dopo il D.L. 179/2012, at 2 
(2013) [Settlement of Overindebtedness Crises per Decree-Law 179/2012],  
http://www.treccani.it/magazine/diritto/approfondimenti/diritto_processuale_
civile_e_delle_procedure_concorsuali/ 2_Panzani_sovraindebitamento_2.html. 
110 Decree-Law of 18 Oct. 2012, no. 179, Ulteriori misure urgenti per la 
crescita del Paese art. 18 [Further urgent measures for the country’s growth] 
(G.U. no. 245, 19 Oct. 2012, ordinary supplement, at 20-28). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Law 17 Dec. 2012, no. 221, art. 18 (G.U. no. 294, 18 Dec. 2012, ordi-
nary supplement, at 21-23). 
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ty.114 The liquidation process unfolds over the course of four 
years, however, and any and all non-exempt property the debt-
or acquires during this period must be turned over to the liqui-
dator.115 This includes a portion of the debtor’s income during 
this four-year period, as discussed below.  Indeed, the Italian 
law is explicit in its expectation that the debtor will do every-
thing reasonably possible to earn a fresh start. Among the re-
quirements for discharge is that the debtor, during the four-
year liquidation period, “has engaged in … income-producing 
activity commensurate with his own abilities and the situation 
of the market or, in any case, has sought work and has not re-
fused, without justification, any proposals for employment.”116  
The Italian law thus takes the more common “earned start” 
approach, rather than the straight “fresh start” approach of the 
Colombian law.117 
 
The second World Bank theme of favoring settlements is 
reflected here, as well.  As in the case of Colombia, Italy began 
in January 2012 with a simple framework for facilitating vol-
untary settlements with creditors.118  Only at the end of that 
year did the notion of a court-ordered discharge enter the law, 
and the liquidation procedure is tellingly described as an “al-
ternative to the proposal for crisis settlement.”119  Unlike  the 
Colombian law,  the liquidation and discharge in the Italian 
law are not secondary and succeed proceedings to the preferred 
settlement negotiations.  This is a free-standing procedure; 
debtors need not seek any compromise with their creditors be-
fore pursuing liquidation-and-discharge relief.120 
                                                            
114 Law 3/2012, supra note 103, art. 14-terdecies (offering “the benefit of 
a clearance of residual debts”). 
115 Id. arts. 14-quinquies (4), 14-novies  (2), (5), 14-undecies.  
116 Law 3/2012, supra note 103, art. 14-terdecies (1)(e).  This fairly un-
common provision is strikingly similar to an earlier one in the German law 
governing personal insolvency and discharge. See Ins [Insolvency Act] § 
295(1)(1) (2013), available at  
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/inso/__295.html. 
117 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
118 See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text. 
119 Law 3/2012, supra note 103, art. 14-ter. (1).  
120  Law 3/2012, supra note 103, art. 14-ter (listing the requirements for 
opening liquidation proceedings, not including debt settlement negotiation); 
See also Law 3/2012, supra note 103, art. 14-decies (listing the conditions for 
a discharge, not including debt settlement negotiation). 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/6
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Further potentially weakening the debt settlement pro-
cess, the Italian proceeding is not constructed on as solid a 
foundation as that in Colombia121 (or, as discussed below, Ire-
land).122 On the one hand, the Italian law recognizes the need 
for institutional support for debtors in proposing and adminis-
tering debt settlement plans.  But it continues to rely on newly-
                                                            
121See conciliation program, supra note 90; See also CODE OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, supra note 82, at art. 533 (assigning responsibility for debt nego-
tiation proceedings first to the existing conciliation centers “expressly author-
ized by the Ministry of Justice and Law to facilitate [advance] this type of 
proceedings, via conciliators registered in their lists” as well as to notary of-
fices, who also have registered conciliators with the proper training required 
by regulation); Ministry of Justice and Law, Decree no. 2677 of 21 December 
2012, art. 13-15 (requiring specialized training for personal debt conciliators); 
Ministry of Justice and Law, Resolution no. 21 of 15 June 2013 (outlining the 
minimum content of training programs for conciliators).  Both of these regu-
lations are available, in Spanish only, online at 
http://www.conciliacion.gov.co/paginas_detalle.aspx?idp=173; Proyecto, supra 
note 56, at 4-7(providing in articles 4-18 for a negotiation procedure with a 
stay of ongoing execution proceedings, but otherwise not constraining credi-
tors’ right to reject workout agreements and recommence execution); see 
MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR Y DE JUSTICIA, CONCILIACIÓN Y ARBITRAJE, supra 
note 63, at 145-146,175. 
122 Proyecto, supra note 56, at 4-7(providing in articles 4-18 for a negotia-
tion procedure with a stay of ongoing execution proceedings, but otherwise 
not constraining creditors’ right to reject workout agreements and recom-
mence execution); see MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR Y DE JUSTICIA, CONCILIACION Y 
ARBITRAJE, supra note 63, at 145-146,175;See conciliation program, supra 
note 90; See also CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 82, art. 533 (assigning 
responsibility for debt negotiation proceedings first to the existing concilia-
tion centers “expressly authorized by the Ministry of Justice and Law to facil-
itate [advance] this type of proceedings, via conciliators registered in their 
lists” as well as to notary offices, who also have registered conciliators with 
the proper training required by regulation); Ministry of Justice and Law, De-
cree no. 2677 of 21 December 2012, art. 13-15 (requiring specialized training 
for personal debt conciliators); Ministry of Justice and Law, Resolution no. 21 
of 15 June 2013 (outlining the minimum content of training programs for 
conciliators).  Both of these regulations are available, in Spanish only, online 
at http://www.conciliacion.gov.co/paginas_detalle.aspx?idp=173.; See also 
Cherubini, supra note 105, at 37 n.4..; Law 3/2012, supra note 103, arts. 7(1), 
9, 11, 13, 15 (establishing in Article 15 that these bodies’ qualifications and 
permissible fees will be regulated by the Ministry of Justice in consultation 
with the Ministry of Economic Development and Ministry of Economy and 
Finance).;See PIA 2012 §§ 48-54, 64, 75, 98, 112, 159-86; Insolvency Service, 
What is a personal insolvency practitioner? INSOLVENCY SERV. OF IR, 
http://www.isi.gov.ie/en/ISI/Pages/Practitioner (providing numerous links 
with further information).; See PIA 2012 §§ 7-24. (The Insolvency Service has 
a very useful website available at www.isi.gov.ie); See WB Report, supra note 
1, ¶¶ 135, 137. 
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established and untested “Crisis Composition Bodies”123 to 
evaluate debtors’ financial history and future payment capaci-
ty, formulate proposed settlement plans, evaluate such plans 
and report to the court,  collect creditor votes on proposals, and  
administer plans accepted by creditors.124
 
It remains to be seen 
how this new institution will develop, especially given the law’s 
insistence that, from the constitution and operation of these 
bodies, there “shall not derive any new or additional burdens 
on public finance.”125  One commentator has already expressed 
some doubt in light of the patently conflicting interests these 
bodies are called upon to serve.126 
Moreover, the desired benefits of the settlement alterna-
tive are undermined by a greater than usual degree of partici-
pation by the courts.  The proceeding is initiated with a court 
filing of the debtor’s proposed plan and a detailed report from 
the Crisis Composition Body on, among other things, the plan’s 
feasibility.127  The court assesses the proposal and sends it to 
creditors to solicit their assent (or rejection).128  Finally, the 
court  must pass on any objections to the plan and confirm its 
implementation.129  While this process is an improvement over 
full-blown court-based litigation, it leaves something to be de-
sired in terms of unencumbering the courts and delegating au-
thority to the out-of-court support system. 
 On the positive side, like the Colombian law,130 the Italian 
rules include powerful leverage measures against holdouts 
from settlements.  Creditors who fail to vote on the debtor’s 
                                                            
123 Cherubini, supra note 105, at 36, 37 n.4.; Law 3/2012, supra note 103, 
art. 15 (establishing that these bodies’ qualifications and permissible fees will 
be regulated by the Ministry of Justice in consultation with the Ministry of 
Economic Development and Ministry of Economy and Finance). 
124 Law 3/2012, supra note 103, arts. 7(1), 9, 11, 13, 15. 
125 Id. art. 15(4) (noting some availability of financing for such bodies un-
der current law).  One commentator reacts to this limitation of funding by 
concluding “[t]his provision does not leave much hope in terms of profession-
alism and efficiency.” See also Panzani, supra note 109, at 15. 
126 See Panzani, supra note 109, at 29.  
127 Law 3/2012, supra note 103, art. 9. 
128 Id. arts. 10,11(1) (directing creditors to submit their votes to the Cri-
sis Composition Body).  
129 Id. arts. 12,13.  
130 See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.  
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settlement proposal are deemed to assent to it.131  So long as 
creditors holding at least 60% of all claims either vote or are 
deemed to vote in favor of the proposal, the settlement becomes 
binding on all ordinary creditors.132  Given the lack of financial 
support for the institutions in the center of this process, as well 
as the ease with which debtors can seek more direct and pre-
dictable relief in the liquidation-and-discharge process, it 
seems safe to predict that the debt settlement process  is no 
better under the now-revised law than  under the original.133 
 
As for the third World Bank Report theme, the Italian law 
follows the growing trend in expecting debtors to earn their 
fresh start, though it does not formulate that expectation with 
the kind of care that international best practices seem to call 
for.  Admirably, the four-year payment period seems relatively 
moderate in the context of worldwide trends.134  Indeed, this 
term was chosen “in line with the models of other countries,” 
with the intent not to squeeze several years of income from 
debtors to compensate creditors, but rather to dissuade debtors 
from seeking the benefit lightly or abusively.135  As for the 
amount of payment to be made during this time, the Italian 
law also admirably focuses on the debtor’s ability to bear the 
burden, not on any minimum payment or expected dividend to 
creditors, as suggested in the World Bank Report.136 
                                                            
131 Law 3/2012, supra note 103, art. 11(1). 
132 Id. arts. 11(2), 12(3) (discussing that alternatively, a consumer debtor 
can submit a proposal for court approval without soliciting creditor support, 
in which case the court may confirm such a plan (binding on all creditors) so 
long as it is feasible and the debtor has not undertaken obligations without a 
reasonable prospect of being able to satisfy them and has not engaged in bor-
rowing disproportionate to his or her financial capacity.). Id. arts. 12-bis, 12-
ter.  These subjective requirements seem likely to be seldom established. See 
Panzani, supra note 109, at 17 (noting that it is “a notion of common experi-
ence” that over indebtedness arises from consumers’ excessive recourse to 
credit and their lack of adequate financial education). 
133 Relazione 179/2012, supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
134 See WB Report, supra note 1, ¶ 268 (noting a standard of 3 to 5 years, 
with a convergence around 5-year payment terms).  
135 Relazione 179/2012, supra note 107 at 44. 
136. WB Report, supra note 1, ¶ 357, ¶ 274; See also Law 3/2012, supra 
note 103, art. 14-terdecies (1)(f) (noting that the law does require that credi-
tors be satisfied at least “in part,”, but so long as courts interpret the law to 
keep this “part” within very modest bounds, one would expect any debtor to 
be able to pay one or two ceremonial Euros to creditors over the course of four 
years.). 
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Unfortunately, the Italian law falls into a common and se-
rious trap identified in the Report,137 in that it assigns the 
court apparently unfettered discretion in determining an ac-
ceptable budget to be reserved for debtors’ and their families’ 
ordinary living expenses during the four-year liquidation peri-
od. While the exemptions for hard assets are made parallel 
with those in ordinary execution law,138 the exemption for the 
debtor’s future income does not take the common approach of 
relying on general income protections (e.g., garnishment re-
strictions).139 Rather, the court is assigned responsibility for de-
termining, with no guidance from any statute, regulation, or 
guideline, how much of the debtor’s future income to reserve as 
“necessary for the maintenance of [the debtor] and of his fami-
ly.”140  With their applications for relief, debtors must submit a 
“list of current expenditures necessary to support [themselves 
and their families].”141  However, there is no clear connection 
between this statement and the court’s determination of an ap-
propriate budget going forward.  This could represent a disas-
ter for debtors and the new insolvency regime if courts tend to 
impose unworkably sparse household budgets, or if  judges in 
different areas of the country adopt widely varying approaches 
to determining budgets.142 
C. Ireland  
While the process and result of producing the new Irish 
consumer insolvency regime were not directly influenced by the 
World Bank Report, the same themes are clearly reflected in 
both projects. This is in part due to the fact that, as discussed 
below, the principal report that drove the Irish process relied 
heavily on two of the primary sources underlying the World 
Bank’s Report. The debate about how to deal with excessive 
                                                            
137  WB Report, supra note 1, ¶¶ 267, 285-90. 
138 Law 3/2012, supra note 103, art. 14-ter (6)(d).  
139 See WB Report, supra note 1, ¶ 292.  
140 Law 3/2012, supra note 103, arts. 14-ter (6)(b), 14-quinquies (2)(f) 
(containing in art. 14-quinquies (2)(f) an obviously erroneous reference to art. 
14-ter (5)(b), intended to refer to art. 14-ter (6)(b), as art. 14-ter (5) has no 
subsections).  
141 Id. arts. 9(2), 14-ter (2). 
142 See WB Report, supra note 1, ¶¶ 287-88 (describing these problems in 
other systems). 
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consumer debt and many individuals’ inability to pay those 
debts has long simmered in Ireland, however. 
Well into the 21st century, the Irish system of debt en-
forcement continued the anachronistic procedure of allowing 
defaulting debtors to be imprisoned for simple failure to pay a 
civil debt.143  While proposals for reform of this long-outdated 
method of debt collection were formulated by the Irish Gov-
ernment in the late 1990s,144 individual debtors were still being 
jailed for simple non-payment of civil debts in the late 2000s.145  
During this same span of time, from the late 1990s to the late 
2000s, Irish consumers were racking up debts at unprecedent-
ed levels.  The national ratio of household debt to disposable 
income rose nearly four-fold, from a moderate 48% to a danger-
ous 176%, an even steeper rise than in debt-riddled countries 
like the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada.146 
While Ireland had a formal bankruptcy system that theo-
retically provided for relief in the form of a discharge of unpaid 
debts, the law was dysfunctional and seldom used by individual 
debtors for a host of reasons. A 2009 report from the Irish legis-
lative research service observed curtly that the bankruptcy sys-
tem was “expensive and … unsuitable for a majority of debt-
ors,” further explaining that it failed to provide for an 
automatic discharge of debt in any case.147
 
Rather, to obtain the 
possibility of relief, a debtor had to pay in full the hefty admin-
                                                            
143 See, e.g., Joseph Spooner, Long Overdue: What The Belated Reform of 
Irish Personal Insolvency Law Tells Us About Comparative Consumer Bank-
ruptcy, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 243, 249 (2012) (reporting that, in 2008 alone, 276 
debtors were imprisoned pursuant to what the author characterizes as “a 
Kafkaesque procedure”). 
144 See Paul Joyce, An End Based on Means?, FREE LEGAL ADVICE 
CENTRES 13 (2003), 
http://www.flac.ie/download/pdf/an_end_based_on_means.pdf. 
145 See Spooner, supra note 143 and accompanying text; Stuart Stamp, A 
Policy Framework for Addressing Over-indebtedness, COMBAT POVERTY 
AGENCY 35 (2009), available at http://www.combatpoverty.ie/publications/ 
APolicyFrameworkForAddressingOverIndebtedness_2009.pdf. 
146 The Debt of the Nation: How we fell in and out of love with debt, 
AMÁRACH RESEARCH 4-5 (2009), available at http://www.amarach.com/assets/ 
files/The%20Debt%20of%20the%20Nation.pdf. 
147 Spotlight: Debt Part 2: Personal Debt and Consequences, OIREACHTAS 
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istrative costs of the formal process, turn over all non-exempt 
property acquired during the course of the next twelve years, 
and even after all this, the court might enter a discharge order 
only upon a finding that it would be “reasonable and proper” to 
grant such extraordinary relief.148 Such an expensive system, 
offering relief that is both too little and too late, is obviously of 
little use to people desperately in need of financial rehabilita-
tion. 
As in Colombia149 and Italy,150 the first Irish policy re-
sponse to the problem of consumer debt default was to set up a 
framework for helping consumers to manage their own finan-
cial affairs and, ultimately, to facilitate private, negotiated set-
tlements between debtors and their creditors.151  In 1992, the 
Irish Government’s Department of Social and Family Affairs 
set up a pilot program of five Money Advice and Budgeting 
Service (MABS) centers, fully funded by the Department.152  
The initial purpose of MABS was to offer advice and assistance 
to low-income families who had been victimized by illegal, high-
cost moneylenders, but the successful pilot project quickly grew 
into a formal service offering generalized money and budgeting 
advice in 65 centers throughout Ireland.153 
In 2003, MABS implemented a pilot initiative with the 
Irish Bankers Federation to establish a framework for volun-
tary debt settlements involving a partial write-off of unsus-
tainable consumer debt.154  This pilot project was limited to 100 
                                                            
148 Id. at 16. 
149 Proyecto, supra note 56, at 4-8 and accompanying text (providing in 
articles 4-18 for a negotiation procedure with a stay of ongoing execution pro-
ceedings, but otherwise not constraining creditors’ right to reject workout 
agreements and recommence execution); see also MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR Y 
DE JUSTICIA, CONCILIACION Y ARBITRAJE, supra note 63, at 145-146,175 and 
accompanying text; See also Law 1380 of 2010, supra note 64.   
150 See Law 3/2012, supra note 103 and accompanying text; See also 
Study on Means to Protect Consumers in Financial Difficulty, supra note 104 
and accompanying text. 
151 See OIREACHTAS LIBR. & RES. SERV., supra note 147, at 3, 14 (observing 
in 2009 that “Ireland’s response to over-indebtedness has largely focused on 
funding MABS.”). 
152 Joyce, supra note 144, at 29. 
153 Id.; Dieter Korczak, The Money Advice and Budgeting Service Ireland, 
PEER REVIEW IN THE FIELD OF SOCIAL INCLUSION POLICIES13 (2004), 
http://www.euro.centre.org/data/1138965609_36492.pdf. 
154 Joyce, supra note 144, at 66-67 (describing the details of the project); 
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cases from select areas of Dublin, and it was not extended be-
yond those few cases, lasting only a few years.155 MABS and 
IBF renewed their debt settlement initiative in 2009, however, 
with an “operational protocol” for negotiating “mutually-
acceptable, affordable and sustainable repayment plan[s]” ex-
plicitly committing a list of key institutional creditors “to ac-
cept payment that may be less than the full amount of the debt 
owed.”156  Early evaluations of this new protocol were quite pos-
itive from both the creditor and debtor side,157 but its salutary 
effects were limited by the small group of creditors who had 
signed on.158  And for debtors with little or no wherewithal to 
make significant payments to their creditors, the protocol could 
offer little or no relief.  
A path had been cleared for a more broadly applicable, 
formal, legislative solution, which would soon receive powerful 
impetus from two sources.  The first would come from an influ-
ential voice within Ireland; the second from outside forces 
drawn in after Ireland as a country experienced the spectacular 
shock of national and international economic crisis.  With such 
potent political forces converging around them, Irish lawmak-
ers were all but forced to modernize their law in line with the 
principal themes of the World Bank’s Report.159 
First, Ireland has an impressive institution, the Law Re-
form Commission (LRC), dedicated to constantly reviewing and 
evaluating Irish law and making suggestions for reform when 
needed.160  One of the main drivers of the LRC’s work are its 
                                                                                                                                     
See also Korczak, supra note 153, at 4. 
155 Joyce, supra note 144, at 66; See also OIREACHTAS LIBR., supra note 
147, at 16 (reporting that the project was terminated in 2006, with no report 
of its success). 
156 IBF-MABS Operational Protocol: Working Together to Manage Debt, 
IRISH BANKING FEDERATION § 1 (2009), http://www.ibf.ie/pdfs/IBF-MABS-
Protocol-June09.pdf.  
157Interim Report: Personal Debt Management and Debt Enforcement, 
LAW REFORM COMMISSION 46 (2010),  
http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/Reports/irDebt.pdf (reporting that “the 
Protocol has delivered generally positive results in terms of agreed repay-
ment arrangements between IBF creditors and MABS clients”). 
158 Id. at 45-46. 
159 See Spooner, supra note 143, at 288-96 (explaining the process leading 
to the reform of Irish personal insolvency law). 
160 Overview, LAW REFORM COMMISSION, http://www.lawreform.ie/law-
reform/overview.445.html. 
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periodic Programmes of Law Reform, which are developed by 
the LRC and subsequently approved by the Government and 
placed before the legislature (both Houses of the Oireachtas).161 
Since its inception in 1975, the LRC has developed and pur-
sued three such Programmes.162 It has produced over 160 con-
sultation papers and reports making proposals for law reform, 
and as a clear testament to the LRC’s influence on Irish law, 
“[m]ost of these proposals have led to reforming legislation.”163  
After a public consultation process that drew a significant 
number of submissions calling for reform of the law related to 
personal debt enforcement, the LRC included this topic in its 
Third Programme of Law Reform, approved by the Government 
in 2007.164 Like the World Bank Report, the LRC’s project on 
“Personal Debt Management and Debt Enforcement” drew 
heavily on two other European sources:165 a European Commis-
sion report on personal over indebtedness166 and the Council of 
Europe’s Recommendation on legal solutions to debt prob-
lems.167  Unsurprisingly, these common sources led the LRC 
                                                            
161 Id. 
162 Programmes of Law Reform, LAW REFORM COMMISSION, 
http://www.lawreform.ie/law-reform/law-reform/ourprogrammes-of-law-
reform.127.html. 
163 Report: Personal Debt Management and Debt Enforcement, LAW 
REFORM COMMISSION ii (2010), available at 
http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/Reports/r100Debt.pdf. [hereinafter, LRC 
Report]. 
164 Id. at ii, 1; Consultation Paper: Personal Debt Management and Debt 
Enforcement, LAW REFORM COMMISSION 1, 3 (2009), http://www.lawreform.ie 
/_fileupload/consultation%20papers/Consultation%20Paper%20on%20Person
al%20Debt%20Management%20and%20Debt%20Enforcement_FINAL%20D
RAFT.pdf [hereinafter, LRC Consultation Paper] (commenting that the 
Commission’s “primary focus … is on … personal insolvency laws and legal 
debt enforcement proceedings”).  
165 LRC Consultation Paper, supra note 164, at 1-3; LRC Report, supra 
note 163, at 1. 
166 Towards A Common Operational European Definition of Over-
Indebtedness, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2008), available atec.europa.eu/social/ 
BlobServlet?docId=5093&langId=en (also cited as a primary source in the 
World Bank’s Report, supra note 1, at ¶ 21(c)). 
167 Commission Recommendation to Member States on Legal Solutions to 
Debt Problems, COM (2007) 999bis final (Jun. 20, 2007) (explaining the 
World Bank Report cited and relied on the expert report on which the Coun-
cil’s Recommendation was based); Johanna Niemi-Kiesiläinen & Ann-Sofie 
Henrikson, Bureau of the European Committee on Legal Co-Operation 
(CDCJ-BU), Report on Legal Solutions to Debt Problems In Credit Societies 
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and the World Bank Working Group to similar conclusions. 
The LRC’s initial Consultation Paper echoed the criticisms 
that have long been levelled at the Irish bankruptcy system;168 
i.e., that it was far too expensive169 and far too parsimonious in 
its offer of relief170 to be of any use to the overwhelming majori-
ty of debtors.171 For the few cases that made it past the opening 
phase, the LRC bristled at the 12-year discharge period, which 
it characterized as “excessively long and contrast[ing] sharply 
with the fresh start principle which characterizes modern con-
sumer insolvency codes.”172  While the LRC concluded that “a 
comprehensive review of bankruptcy legislation lies outside the 
scope of” its reform agenda,173 its final Report nonetheless of-
fered a detailed analysis of key proposed bankruptcy reforms; 
concentrating on the introduction of an automatic discharge af-
ter a three-year period during which the debtor might be called 
upon to make payments to creditors from surplus income.174  
While the amount of these payments in the bankruptcy context 
was not expressly addressed, similar payments were consid-
ered in the context of out-of-court settlements, including the 
necessity of leaving sufficient income with debtors to support a 
reasonable standard of living.175  But no specific approach was 
suggested here, as the LRC conceded “the calculation of rea-
sonable living expenses is an issue lying far outside the compe-
tence of a law reform body.”176
 
The clear concentration of the 
                                                                                                                                     
(2005), http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cdcj/CJSDEBT/CDCJ-
BU_2005_11e%20rev.pdf; See WB Report, supra note 1, at ¶ 21(b). 
168 See, e.g., OIREACHTAS LIBR. & RES. SERV., supra note 147, at 3, 16. 
169 LRC Consultation Paper, supra note 164, at 113, 116 (criticizing the 
requirements that debtors seeking relief prove that a liquidation of their as-
sets will produce at least 1900 Euros, and that they deposit 650 Euros with 
the bankruptcy administrator, along with any further sums necessary to cov-
er ongoing administrative costs of fees). 
170 LRC Consultation Paper, supra note 164, at 113-14 (criticizing the re-
quirements for a discharge as “severely onerous by international standards.”) 
171 LRC Consultation Paper, supra note 164, at 114 (observing the 
miniscule numbers of bankruptcy petitions filed and cases opened in recent 
years, e.g., only 20 petitions in 2007 with only four leading to opened cases).   
172 LRC Consultation Paper, supra note 164, at 117. 
173 LRC Consultation Paper, supra note 164, at 122. 
174 LRC Report, supra note 163, at 145-86, 319-21, 413-16 (allowing the 
court to require payments for up to 5 years).  
175 LRC Report, supra at 93-95, 314, 372-73. 
176 LRC Report, supra at 94. 
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LRC’s review and final Report was on a new system of non-
judicial debt settlements, along the lines of the MABS-IBF ini-
tiatives,177 but overseen by a central government regulator, ex-
tending to all creditors, and resting on a broader and more 
formalized institutional foundation.178  Thus, the three themes 
of the World Bank’s Report appeared prominently at this early 
stage in the reform process, advanced with the considerable 
persuasive force of the national institution most responsible for 
driving forward Irish law reform. 
  An equally if not more powerful law reform force, would 
exert its influence in the wake of the devastating impact of the 
global financial crisis in Ireland.  A collapse in property values 
and bank balance sheets led to a cascade of negative effects on 
state revenue collection, credit availability and unemployment, 
plunging Ireland into a particularly severe recession from 2008 
to 2010.179  Ireland’s GDP suffered a cumulative decline of more 
than 20% between the first quarter of 2008 and the third quar-
ter of 2010.180 Though the treasury was bringing in fewer tax 
receipts, the Irish Government resorted to heavy deficit spend-
ing to bail out the banking sector and attempt to reign in the 
exploding economic crisis.181  This undermined the nation’s 
credit reputation in international markets, effectively shutting 
off a vital source of financing.182 The massive scope of the prob-
lem required large-scale external assistance. 
   In November 2010, Irish authorities formally requested 
                                                            
177 Joyce, supra at 29, 66-67 (describing on pages 66-67 the details of the 
projects); Korczak, supra note 153 at 4, 13; OIREACHTAS LIBR. & RES. SERV., 
supra 16, (reporting that the project was terminated in 2006, with no report 
of its success); IBF-MABS Operational Protocol: Working Together to Manage 
Debt, IRISH BANKING FEDERATION § 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.ibf.ie/pdfs/IBF-MABS-Protocol-June09.pdf; LAW REFORM 
COMMISSION, supra note 157 at 46 (reporting that “the Protocol has delivered 
generally positive results in terms of agreed repayment arrangements be-
tween IBF creditors and MABS clients). 
178 LRC Consultation Paper, supra note 164, at 122; LRC Report, supra 
note 163, at 5-110, 307-16, 349-73. 
179 Philip R. Lane, The Irish Crisis, THE WORLD FINANCIAL REVIEW (2011) 
http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=874. 
180 Lane, supra note 179. 
181 Representation in Ireland, Ireland’s economic crisis: how did it hap-
pen and what is being done about it?, EUROPEAN COMM’N, (Feb. 22, 2012),  
http://ec.europa.eu/ireland/economy/irelands_economic_crisis/index_en.htm. 
182 Representation in Ireland, supra.  
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financial assistance from the European Union, the European 
Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund (often re-
ferred to colloquially as “the Troika”).183  This assistance was 
made contingent on Irish authorities’ undertaking several 
steps to reform the financial sector and increase growth poten-
tial.  In an initial Memorandum of Economic and Financial Pol-
icies, the Council of the European Union outlined several steps 
that Ireland was expected to take as part of the assistance pro-
gram.184 One of these, related to the primary goal of restoring 
financial sector viability, was to “reform the personal insolven-
cy regime … [to] balance the interests of both creditors and 
debtors.”185 These reforms would “include a non-judicial debt 
settlement and enforcement mechanism as an alternative to 
court-supervised proceedings.”186  The European Commission 
was charged with monitoring progress toward these reforms,187 
and it laid out quarterly goal for their achievement, including 
in the very first quarter of the program “[a]n in-depth review of 
the personal debt regime,”188 which was forthcoming within 
days from the LRC, as described above.189 By the first quarter 
                                                            
183 Economic and Financial Affairs, Council agrees on joint EU-IMF fi-
nancial assistance package for Ireland, EUROPEAN COMM’N, (Jul. 12, 2010), 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/eu_economic_situation/2010-12-
01-financial-assistanceireland_en.htm. 
184 Council of the European Union, Memorandum of Economic and Fi-
nancial Policies 1 (Dec. 7, 2010),http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/ 
eu_economic_situation/pdf/2010-12-07-mefp_en.pdf. 
185 Council of European Union, supra at 4 ¶ 16. 
186 Council of European Union, supra at 4 ¶ 16. 
187 Council Implementing Decision  2011/77/EU, on Granting Union Fi-
nancial Assistance to Ireland, 2010 O.J. (L 30), 34, ¶ 8, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/eu_economic_situation/pdf/2010-
12-07-council_imp_decision_en.pdf. 
188 European Commission, Ireland Memorandum of Understanding on 
Specific Economic Policy Conditionality 6 (Dec. 3, 2010), 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/eu_economic_situation/pdf/2010-
12-07-mou_en.pdf. 
189 LRC Report, supra note 163 at 93-95, 145-86, 314, 319-21, 372-73, 
413-16 (allowing the court to require payments for up to 5 years); LRC Con-
sultation Paper, supra note 164, at 122; Joyce, supra at 29, 66-67 (describing 
on pages 66-67 the details of the projects); Korczak, supra note 153 at 4, 13; 
OIREACHTAS LIBR. & RES. SERV., supra 16, (reporting that the project was 
terminated in 2006, with no report of its success); IBF-MABS Operational 
Protocol: Working Together to Manage Debt, IRISH BANKING FEDERATION § 1 
(2009), available at http://www.ibf.ie/pdfs/IBF-MABS-Protocol-June09.pdf; 
LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 157 at 46 (reporting that “the Protocol 
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of 2012, reform legislation was expected to be presented to the 
Irish legislature.190 
 
With the internal political process already primed for re-
form of the personal insolvency regime, the Troika’s external 
goading simply increased the pace of progress already well un-
derway. In January 2012, the Minister for Justice and Equality 
announced a draft bill, in large part implementing the LRC’s 
recommendations discussed above,191 for reforming the bank-
ruptcy law and implementing several non-judicial debt settle-
ment schemes.192  A conforming Government bill was intro-
duced into the legislature in June 2012.193 The virtually 
unchanged bill was eventually adopted before being signed into 
law on 26 December 2012.194 The Personal Insolvency Act 2012 
became effective at various points in 2013, with the final piece, 
the bankruptcy reforms, becoming effective on 3 December 
2013.195  While still subject to substantial criticism,196 the Irish 
                                                                                                                                     
has delivered generally positive results in terms of agreed repayment ar-
rangements between IBF creditors and MABS clients). 
190 European Commission, Ireland Memorandum of Understanding on 
Specific Economic Policy Conditionality 11 (Dec. 3, 2010), 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/eu_economic_situation/pdf/2010-
12-07-mou_en.pdf. 
191 See supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text. LRC Consultation Pa-
per, supra note 164, at 122; LRC Report, supra note 163, at 145-86, 319-21, 
413-16 (allowing the court to require payments for up to 5 years); See Id. at 
93-95, 314, 372-73; Id. at 94; see Joyce, supra note 144, at 29, 66-67 and ac-
companying text; Korcak, supra note 153, at 4, 13 and accompanying text; 
OIREACHTAS LIBR.., supra note 147, at 16 (reporting that the project was ter-
minated in 2006, with no report of its success) and accompanying text; IRISH 
BANKING FEDERATION, supra note 156, § 1 and accompanying text; LAW 
REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 157, at 46 and accompanying text. 
192 Department of Justice and Equality, Minister Shatter and Minister 
Noonan publish Scheme of Personal Insolvency Bill  (25 Jan. 2012), 
http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/PR12000013. 
193 Personal Insolvency Bill 2012 as initiated and Explanatory Memoran-
dum, HOUSE OF THE OIREACHTAS, available at http://www.oireachtas.ie/ 
viewdoc.asp?fn=/documents/bills28/bills/2012/5812/b58112d.pdf. 
194 Personal Insolvency Act 2012 (Act No. 44/2012) (Ir.) [hereinafter, PIA 
2012], available at http://www.isi.gov.ie/en/ISI/Personal%20Insolvency%20 
Act.pdf/Files/Personal%20Insolvency%20Act.pdf. 
195 See Commencement Orders, INSOLVENCY SERV. OF IR. (2013), 
http://www.isi.gov.ie/en/ISI/Pages/Legislation; Julie Murphy-O’Connor et al., 
Commencement of reformed bankruptcy laws announced by Minister Shatter 
(4 Dec. 2013), http://www.matheson.com/news-and-insights/article/ 
commencement-of-reformed-bankruptcy-laws-announced. 
196 See, e.g., Free Legal Advice Centers, 21st century law needed for 21st 
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/6
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personal insolvency regime has been thoroughly modernized 
very much in line with the World Bank Report’s three main 
themes. 
 The changes to the discharge requirements represent a 
real innovation, essentially introducing effective relief where 
none had existed before. The much-maligned twelve-year wait-
ing period and requirement that the court find it “reasonable 
and proper” to grant a discharge have been relegated to the 
past. Debtors are now entitled to an automatic, non-
discretionary discharge on the third anniversary of the date of 
the order opening their bankruptcy case.197
 
Unlike the Colom-
bian discharge,198 however, relief under the new Irish law is 
neither immediate nor necessarily cost-free. Irish debtors may 
have to earn their discharge by making years of imposed pay-
ments to their creditors, as discussed below.199 
Also, the new Irish law implements and clearly favors a 
new regime for negotiated arrangements among creditors and 
debtors.  The new Irish law prioritizes these out-of-court solu-
tions, likely just as effectively if not as emphatically as the Co-
lombian law.200  While negotiation with creditors is not abso-
lutely required as a prerequisite to seeking a discharge in 
bankruptcy, debtors petitioning for bankruptcy relief must 
swear that that they have “made reasonable efforts to reach an 
appropriate arrangement with … creditors” by negotiating one 
of these out-of-court plans “to the extent that the circumstances 
                                                                                                                                     
century over-indebtedness!,  
http://www.flac.ie/campaigns/current/21st-century-law-needed-for-21st-
century-overindebtedness/ (collecting materials critical of many aspects of the 
personal insolvency scheme as proposed and ultimately adopted); Charlie 
Weston, Insolvency deals not open to poorer families, says study, IRISH 
INDEPENDENT (26 Sept. 2013), http://www.independent.ie/business/ 
personal-finance/insolvency-deals-not-open-to-poorer-families-saysstudy-
29611510.html. 
197 See PIA 2012 § 157 (amending Bankruptcy Act 1988 § 85(1)).  Of 
course, administrators and creditors can object to the entry of a discharge if 
the debtor has failed to cooperate or hidden assets, but this is the exception 
rather than the norm now. See also PIA 2012 § 157 (adding a new section 85A 
to Bankruptcy Act 1988). 
198 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. Citation ok, cannot find 
English version of the CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 82, art. 553 
(“Acuerdo de pago”). 
199 See infra notes 220-23 and accompanying text. 
200 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
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of the debtor would permit him to enter into such an arrange-
ment.”201 
 
An analysis of the details of the complex system of so-
called Debt Settlement Arrangements202 and Personal Insol-
vency Arrangements203 is beyond the scope of this paper,204
 
but 
suffice it to say that these schemes represent negotiation plat-
forms very similar to the conciliation regime in Colombia,205 
especially in two essential respects.  First, they build on an ex-
isting institutional framework supporting consumer debt nego-
tiation—MABS206—just as the Colombian system leveraged the 
existing conciliation centers.207 Indeed, somewhat like the Ital-
                                                            
201 See PIA 2012 § 145 (amending and supplementing Bankruptcy Act 
1988 § 11(4)).  A similar preference for out-of-court arrangements is ex-
pressed in the amended sections 14 and 15 of the Bankruptcy Act 1988, 
which now invites the court to adjourn any hearing on a creditor- or debtor-
initiated bankruptcy petition if the debtor’s situation might “be more appro-
priately dealt with by means of” one of the negotiated solutions. See PIA 2012 
§§ 147, 148.  
202 See PIA 2012 §§ 55-58. 
203 See PIA 2012 §§ 89-125. 
204 For lucid and detailed descriptions of the operations of these ar-
rangements, including as applied to hypothetical debtors of various kinds, the 
Insolvency Service has made several pamphlets available on its website. See 
Guide to a Debt Settlement Arrangement, INSOLVENCY SERV. OF IR. (2013),  
http://www.isi.gov.ie/en/ISI/DSA%20final%20pdf.pdf/Files/DSA%20final
%20pdf.pdf; Guide to a Personal Insolvency Arrangement, INSOLVENCY SERV. 
OF IR. (2013), http://www.isi.gov.ie/en/ISI/PIA-Revised%2016%20August 
%202013.pdf/Files/PIARevised%2016%20August%202013.pdf; Debt Solutions 
Scenarios Pack, INSOLVENCY SERV. OF IR. (2014),http://www.isi.gov.ie/ 
en/ISI/ScenariosPackMarch2014.pdf/Files/ScenariosPackMarch2014.pdf. 
205 See Proyecto, supra note 56, at 4-9; see MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR Y DE 
JUSTICIA, CONCILIACION Y ARBITRAJE, supra note 63; see also Law 1380 of 
2010, supra note 64; Email from Diana Lucia Talero, supra note 73 and 
Email from Diana Lucia Talero; see Informe de Ponencia, supra note 76; see 
WB Report, supra note 30: see WB Report, supra note 31; see KILBORN, supra 
28, at 18; see also Statement on the Report on the Treatment of the Insolven-
cy of Natural Persons, supra note 34; see Block-Lieb, supra note 5 §1: see WB 
Report, supra note 19; see also 
WB Report, supra note 1, at ¶ 129; Law 3/2012, supra note 3; see London 
Economics, supra note 104; see Joyce, supra note 144, at 29 and accompany-
ing text. 
207 Proyecto supra note 56, at 4-7; see also MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR Y DE 
JUSTICIA, CONCILIACION Y ARBITRAJE, supra note 63 at 145-46, 175. On the na-
tional conciliation program, spearheaded by the Ministry of Justice and Law, 
see http://www.conciliacion.gov.co/; see also CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra 
note 82, art 533 (assigning responsibility for debt negotiation proceedings 
first to the existing conciliation centers “expressly authorized by the Ministry 
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/6
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ian approach of Crisis Composition Bodies,208 but much more 
developed, the Irish law creates an entire new industry of “Per-
sonal Insolvency Practitioners,” enticing professionals like law-
yers and accountants to represent individual debtors in negoti-
ating and administering these debt settlement schemes.209  
These PIPs are regulated by an entirely new public institution, 
the Insolvency Service, set up to oversee the entire Irish per-
sonal insolvency regime and ensure its smooth and effective 
operation.210  This impressive new framework provides vital in-
stitutional support for the sensitive process of negotiating these 
out-of-court arrangements, an essential ingredient for greater 
success identified in the World Bank Report.211 
Second, though not as aggressive as either the Colombi-
an212 or Italian213 laws, the new Irish law contains a mecha-
                                                                                                                                     
of Justice and Law to facilitate [advance] this type of proceedings, via concili-
ators registered in their lists” as well as to notary offices, who also have reg-
istered conciliators with the proper training required by regulation); Ministry 
of Justice and Law, Decree no. 2677 of 21 December 2012, art. 13-15 (requir-
ing specialized training for personal debt conciliators); Ministry of Justice 
and Law, Resolution no. 21 of 15 June 2013 (outlining the minimum content 
of training programs for conciliators).  Both of these regulations are availa-
ble, in Spanish only, online at http://www.conciliacion.gov.co/paginas_ 
detalle.aspx?idp=173.]   
208 See Cherubini at 36, 37 n. 4.; Cherubini, supra note 106 and accom-
panying text; Law 3/2012, supra note 103, art. 15 (establishing that these 
bodies’ qualifications and permissible fees will be regulated by the Ministry of 
Justice in consultation with the Ministry of Economic Development and Min-
istry of Economy and Finance); Law 3/2012, supra note 103, arts. 7(1), 9, 11, 
13, 15. 
209 See PIA 2012 §§ 48-54, 64, 75, 98, 112, 159-86; What is a personal in-
solvency practitioner?, INSOLVENCY SERV. OF IR., http://www.isi.gov.ie/ 
en/ISI/Pages/Practitioner (providing numerous links with further infor-
mation). 
210 See PIA 2012 §§ 7-24. (The Insolvency Service has a very useful web-
site available at www.isi.gov.ie). 
211 WB Report at 135, 137. 
212 CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 82, art. 553(2).  The expected 
duration of such plans is five years, though longer terms are allowed with the 
assent of 60% of creditors or for claims with an original maturity period ex-
ceeding five years; Id. art. 553(10); Id. art. 558. 
213 Law 3/2012, supra note 103, art. 11(1); Id. arts. 11(2), 12(3). Alterna-
tively, a consumer debtor can submit a proposal for court approval without 
soliciting creditor support, in which case the court may confirm such a plan 
(binding on all creditors) so long as it is feasible and the debtor has not un-
dertaken obligations without a reasonable prospect of being able to satisfy 
them and has not engaged in borrowing disproportionate to his or her finan-
cial capacity; Id. arts. 12-bis, 12-ter.  These subjective requirements seem 
35
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nism for overcoming holdouts.  Here again, agreement is not 
required from 100% of a debtor’s creditors; rather, both of the 
new settlement arrangements can be imposed on dissenting 
creditors with the support of a majority of creditors holding at 
least 65% of the debts due to voting creditors.214 The Insolvency 
Service has already begun to take further steps to encourage 
the establishment of the new statutory debt settlement agree-
ments by developing a protocol, or template, for “standard” or 
“straightforward” proposals.215 
Finally, Ireland joined Italy216 in rejecting the Colombian 
unconditional discharge,217
 
adopting an approach more in line 
with the World Bank Report’s third theme:  The Irish bank-
ruptcy law envisions at least some debtors being called on to 
earn their fresh start by making payments from surplus in-
come over a period of time.  The Irish approach here raises sim-
ilar concerns as under the Italian law,218 though the Irish re-
gime takes important steps to mitigate these concerns.  The 
Irish law takes the highly criticized approach219 of vesting the 
court with discretion in deciding whether, for how long, and 
                                                                                                                                     
likely to be seldom established; see Panzani, supra note 109, at 17 (noting 
that it is “a notion of common experience” that over-indebtedness arises from 
consumers’ excessive recourse to credit and their lack of adequate financial 
education). 
214 See PIA 2012 §§ 73,110 (additionally requiring approval by creditors 
holding at least a majority of both unsecured and secured debts, separately 
calculated, in Personal Insolvency Arrangements). 
215 Protocol, INSOLVENCY SERV. OF IR., 
http://www.isi.gov.ie/en/ISI/Pages/Protocol_Team (describing the creation of a 
Debt Solutions Protocol Steering Group to formulate this template). 
216 WB Report, supra note 1, ¶¶ 267-268, 274, 285-290, 292, 357; Relizone 
179/2012, supra note 107, at 44; Law 3/2012, supra note 103, art. 14-ter 1(f), 
2, 6(b), art. 14-quinquies 2(f), 9(2) (discussing in art. 14-ter 1(f), but so long as 
courts interpret the law to keep this “part” within very modest bounds, one 
would expect any debtor to be able to pay one or two ceremonial Euros to 
creditors over the course of four years)(discussing in art. 14-quinquies 2(f), 
containing an obviously erroneous reference to art. 14-ter (5)(b), intended to 
refer to art. 14-ter (6)(b), as art. 14-ter (5) has no subsections). 
217 CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 82, arts. 563-71 and accompa-
nying text. 
218 WB Report, supra note 1, ¶¶ 267, 285-290, 292; Law 3/2012, supra 
note, art. 14-ter 2, 6(b), 6(d), 14-quinquies 9(2) (discussing 14-quinquies, con-
taining an obviously erroneous reference to art. 14-ter (5)(b), intended to refer 
to art. 14-ter (6)(b), as art. 14-ter (5) has no subsections).   . 
219 WB Report, supra note 1, ¶¶ 267, 285-89, 290   and accompanying 
text. 
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how much payment to demand of debtors.220
 
If the case or sys-
tem administrator221 makes an application for an order requir-
ing the debtor to make payments to creditors from surplus in-
come, the court “may” condition the discharge on the debtor’s 
compliance with a “bankruptcy payment order.”222  Only time 
will tell how often such applications will be made, how often 
courts will elect to impose such “bankruptcy payment orders,” 
and what kinds of burdens they might impose on debtors in the 
bankruptcy process.223 
 
The court’s discretion, however, is not totally unfettered.  
If the court chooses to impose a bankruptcy payment order, the 
law at least prescribes or suggests limits for the length and cal-
culation of such payments, consistent with the World Bank Re-
port’s caution against overly burdensome expectations.224  The 
duration of the payment obligation is capped at five years, thus 
potentially extending beyond the automatic grant of discharge 
relief three years after the bankruptcy case is opened.225  This 
again is in line with the Report’s observations on “normal” 
payment terms.226 
As for the amount of payment to be expected, the Irish law 
again hews carefully to the preferred approach in the World 
Bank Report, focusing on the reasonableness of the burden im-
posed on the debtor rather than the expected return to credi-
tors.227  While leaving the amount of required payments to the 
discretion of the court, the law prescribes that courts “shall 
                                                            
220 See PIA 2012 § 157 (adding a new section 85D(1) to the Bankruptcy 
Act 1988). 
221 Creditors are apparently not allowed to make such applications.  See 
Id. 
222 Id. 
223 In the parallel system in England and Wales, courts enter so-called 
“income payment orders” in only about one-fifth of bankruptcy cases.  The In-
solvency Service, Profiles of bankrupts: 2005/6 to 2007/8 § 2.9 (2009), 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/insolvency/~/media/24110E1C3E434BB2B10006E2019
F0046.ashx; A.J. NOORDAM ET AL., SCHULDSANERING (EX)ONDERNEMERS 333 
(2013). 
224 WB Report, supra note 1, ¶¶ 262-301, 312, 357-58 and accompanying 
text. 
225 See PIA 2012 § 157 (adding a new section 85D(3) to the Bankruptcy 
Act 1988). 
226 WB Report, supra note 1, ¶ 268 (noting a standard of 3 to 5 years, 
with a convergence around 5 years). 
227 WB Report, supra note 1, ¶¶ 49-50 and accompanying text. 
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have regard for the reasonable living expenses of the bankrupt 
and his or her dependants.”228 Further, the law suggests that 
courts look for guidance to a uniform standard developed by 
policymakers, proposing that the court “may” also have regard 




The Insolvency Service has already developed such guide-
lines, and both the process of their development and the final 
product are models of good practice.  As required by the law,230
 
the Insolvency Service consulted a wide variety of indicators 
and experts on the subject of household income and expenses, 
including very sensitive and detailed guidelines developed over 
twelve years of extensive research by the Vincentian Partner-
ship for Social Justice.231 The Insolvency Service conducted a 
“consensual budgeting” project using focus groups to identify 
appropriate categories and amounts of expenditures for a min-
imum standard of living for various household types.232  The 
result is a budget that “is neither a survival standard nor a 
standard for people in poverty; rather it is a standard of living 
that should allow for people to engage in activities that are 
considered the norm for Irish society.”233 These guidelines will 
be updated at least annually to reflect changing costs of liv-
ing.234  They represent an extraordinary example of standards 
for a modest but dignified lifestyle, perfectly consonant with 
                                                            
228 See PIA 2012 § 157 (adding a new section 85D(4) to the Bankruptcy 
Act 1988).  
229 Id.; see also id. § 23 (requiring the Insolvency Service to develop such 
guidelines). 
230 Id. § 23(2)-(3). 
231 Insolvency Service, Guidelines on a reasonable standard of living and 
reasonable living expenses 5-7, 16-20 (2013), 
http://www.isi.gov.ie/en/ISI/Guidelines_under_section%2023_June_13.pdf/Fil
es/Guidelines_under_section %2023_June_13.pdf [hereinafter, ISI Guide-
lines].  
232 Id. at 21-30.  This consensual budgeting process is one specifically 
identified example of an effective process for creating a basic budget for 
bankruptcy payment requirements.  WB Report, supra note 1, ¶ 297. 
233 ISI Guidelines, supra note 231, at 24. 
234 Id. at 7; PIA 2012 § 23(6); Reasonable Living Expenses Guidelines, 
INSOLVENCY SERV. OF IR. http://www.isi.gov.ie/en/ISI/Pages/ 
Reasonable_living_expenses, (announcing that “[i]t is the intention of the [In-
solvency Service] to reissue these guidelines annually, reflecting the CPI ad-
justments”). 
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the third theme of the World Bank Report and the Council of 
Europe’s Recommendation for protecting the human rights of 
insolvent debtors.235 
IV. CONCLUSION  
While all three of these newest systems confirm the 
tendencies identified in the World Bank Report, they also con-
firm another key observation:  Reasonable minds can and will 
differ on the best policies and the best ways of implementing 
those policies in this area.236 World lawmakers will continue to 
differ in how they extend relief to over indebted individuals, 
and that diversity is generally healthy. The Report expressly 
disavows any desire to “mainstream” world legislation or to 
impose a one-size-fits-all approach in all regions.237 But it is 
satisfying to see that the Report has had both direct and indi-
rect influence in sensitizing policymakers to the benefits of of-
fering this kind of relief to individuals, and that many of the 
now-obvious missteps of the past are being more or less deftly 
avoided by current lawmakers.  As more countries follow Co-
lombia, Italy, and Ireland down the difficult path toward adopt-
ing legislative relief for personal insolvency, I hope the lessons 
of the Report spread around the globe and help millions more 
debtors to escape from hopeless over indebtedness, in turn 
helping their countries to enjoy maximal productivity and 
healthy levels of social inclusion.  We, legal academics, seldom 
get a chance to see our work having a direct, positive influence 
on the lives of others.  I have seen that here, and the World 





                                                            
235 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. 
236 WB Report, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 12, 29, 53-54. 
237 WB Report, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 53-54.   
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